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Timely Revolutions  
On the Timelessness of the Unconscious  
Fanny Söderbäck  
Siena College 
From her very earliest works to the essay published in this volume, Julia 
Kristeva has been preoccupied with the question of revolt. What, she asks 
time and again, is revolt? Is it even possible given our cultural circumstances 
and the state of “crisis” that characterizes modernity as we know it? How is 
it related to those practices and experiences that most concern her – art, 
poetry, and psychoanalysis – and how do these, in turn, carry revolutionary 
potential? What kind of subversion, finally, does revolt offer in the face of 
religious fundamentalism, financial crises, the invasion of the spectacle, or 
even radical evil?  
In the essay published here, as well as in her previous work, Kristeva 
locates revolt in the intimate sphere, and she describes it in terms of return, 
recollection, rebirth, re-creation, and renewal. It is, as she puts it, “an 
indication of life that is unambiguously alive,” and it is made possible 
through vigorous interrogation and critical thought. Through retrospective 
return we go in search of ourselves, and in the process we revisit our past in 
order to open our future. Elsewhere, I have discussed Kristeva’s concept of 
revolt precisely as a temporal phenomenon, highlighting her consistent 
emphasis on revolt as a movement of return that makes possible renewal 
and change – what I have called “revolutionary time.”1 In what follows, I 
want to focus on a particular dimension of her temporal analysis, namely, 
her association of revolt with the Freudian Zeitlos, or the timelessness of the 
unconscious, which she discussed at length already in Intimate Revolt, and 
which appears again in the present essay as one of the “logical paradoxes” 
that haunts revolt, if indeed we understand the latter as a feature of psychic 
life and its social manifestations (writing, thought, art…). How, I ask, can 
Kristeva’s discussion of the timelessness of the unconscious be reconciled 
with the temporal analysis of revolt that I have offered elsewhere? How, in 
other words, can a revolt marked by “timelessness” nevertheless be 
characterized as essentially “temporal” in nature?  
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*** 
If time traditionally has been viewed as located in consciousness, one 
might ask how we are to think time once we have established, with Sigmund 
Freud, that the subject is unconscious. Kristeva raises this very concern in 
her book Intimate Revolt: “If we emancipate ourselves from the ‘symptom of 
“being conscious”,’ what about time? . . . What do we do with time, by 
definition conscious, if we postulate an unconscious psyche?”2 These 
questions bring her straight to what she calls the Freudian “scandal” of the 
Zeitlos, or timeless. Kristeva notes that the early Freud keeps with the classic 
philosophical thesis that time is a given of consciousness, but that, starting 
with The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), “the unconscious as well as the id” 
begin to “enjoy a temporality called Zeitlos (timeless).”3 Freud himself says 
notoriously little of this concept. It is introduced in passing in his essay “The 
Unconscious” (1915). Here, Freud attempts to establish the special properties 
of the unconscious, and he states that one such property is that the processes 
in the unconscious system “are timeless, i.e., are not chronologically ordered, 
are not altered by the passage of time, indeed bear no relation to time 
whatsoever.”4 He acknowledges that his description of the unconscious 
might come across as both “obscure” and “confused,”5 yet when he revisits 
the notion of timelessness five years later in Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920), he does not provide much more clarity:  
As a result of certain psycho-analytic discoveries, we are 
to-day in a position to embark on a discussion of the 
Kantian theorem that time and space are ‘necessary forms 
of thought’. We have learnt that unconscious mental 
processes are in themselves ‘timeless’. This means in the 
first place that they are not ordered temporally, that time 
does not change them in any way and that the idea of time 
cannot be applied to them.6  
What we are to make of these allusive remarks remains contested. Freud 
himself simply reiterates that his own understanding is limited. In his New 
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933), he again revisits the topic of 
the timeless, now using the terminology of the id rather than the 
unconscious:  
There is nothing in the id that corresponds to the idea of 
time; there is no recognition of the passage of time, and – a 
thing that is most remarkable and awaits consideration in 
philosophical thought – no alteration in its mental 
processes is produced by the passage of time. Wishful 
impulses which have never passed beyond the id, but 
impressions, too, which have been sunk into the id by 
repression, are virtually immortal; after the passage of 
decades they behave as though they had just occurred. 
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They can only be recognized as belonging to the past, can 
only lose their importance and be deprived of their 
cathexis of energy, when they have been made conscious 
by the work of analysis, and it is on this that the 
therapeutic effect of analytic treatment rests to no small 
extent.7 
It is worth noting that Freud, here, defines the task of psychoanalysis as 
making temporal the atemporal content of the id. To bring repressed 
memories to consciousness would, in other words, amount to giving them a 
proper place in (linear) time – to acknowledge them as belonging to the past 
so as to not compulsively repeat them in the future. 
Freud’s references to the timelessness of the unconscious appear in 
what is usually described as his metapsychological work. Adrian Johnston 
explains that “the metapsychological domain contains the aggregate of a 
priori principles that must be in place at the outset for the initiation of 
analytic interpretation as such.”8 Metapsychology, in other words, 
establishes the fundamental concepts used to represent and describe the 
operation of the mental apparatus. We might say that it establishes the 
conditions of possibility for all subsequent clinical work; it sets up the scene 
for analysis. Freud himself saw metapsychology within the field of 
psychoanalysis as analogous with metaphysics in the field of philosophy. 
Does this imply that the timelessness of the unconscious would be Freud’s 
version of what philosophers refer to as “metaphysical presence”? Does the 
timelessness of the unconscious imply a subject somehow exempt from the 
movement of time? And if so, how does the timelessness of the unconscious 
square with Kristeva’s insistence on the inherently temporal nature of 
human existence in general and of revolt in particular?  
There should be no doubt that Freud’s statement about the timelessness 
of the unconscious offers a challenge to any traditional account of time. If 
Kristeva is right in suggesting that Freud’s theory of the unconscious was a 
“Copernican revolution” of sorts – a claim that she makes both in Strangers 
to Ourselves and in the present essay,9 this revolution is, she notes elsewhere, 
nothing other than “a revolution of the conception of time.”10 She ascribes 
“an incomparable originality” to “the Freudian Zeitlos.”11 It is, in her view, 
different from all previous attempts to conceptualize time, from Aristotle 
and Saint Augustine to Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Heidegger. As 
she puts it in the present essay: “Freud underscored the unprecedented 
timelessness (Zeitlos), which no philosophy had identified before him and which 
characterizes the unconscious” (emphasis mine). The unconscious, she 
explains elsewhere, has “its own time,” and Freud is repeatedly described as 
a “revolutionary of lost time.”12  
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Adrian Johnston similarly characterizes Freud’s “dethroning of the self-
transparent, rational subject” as such a “radical rupture in the history of 
ideas” that it is worthy of the epithet revolutionary.13 But he raises concerns:  
All revolutions naturally appear novel when contrasted 
with the status quo against which they react. However, at 
the same time, all revolutions also contain the seeds of 
their own destruction. If successful in overthrowing the 
previous theoretical regime, a revolutionary theory 
immediately runs the risk of becoming as complacent as 
its predecessor. Although this observation is itself 
practically a truism, the revolutionaries frequently become 
the new tyrants.14  
How, we must ask, can psychoanalysis – and the revolt it gives rise to on 
Kristeva’s account here and elsewhere – avoid stagnation and complacency? 
How are we to assure that the Freudian theory of the unconscious – one that, 
among other things, was formulated as a critical response to the metaphysics 
of presence – not posits yet another version of such presence, articulated 
precisely in terms of a “timelessness” embedded at the core of the human 
psyche? Does the Freudian revolution amount to nothing more than a 
removal of eternity from the “there” and “beyond,” by placing it instead at 
the heart of the “here” and “now” of finite life, and if this is so, can Kristeva 
remain faithful to Freud while at the same time characterizing intimate 
revolt as a movement of perpetual return and renewal, a movement marked 
by time?  
In order to address these questions, we must do some of the 
clarificatory work that Freud himself avoided. What, we must ask, does it 
mean to say that the unconscious is “timeless”? Is this timelessness similar to 
or different from the selfsame everlasting presence that is such a core feature 
of the metaphysical tradition? According to Freud himself, as we have seen, 
unconscious processes are timeless because they “are not chronologically 
ordered, are not altered by the passage of time, indeed bear no relation to 
time whatsoever.” Or, in the later formulation also quoted above, their 
timelessness is explained by the fact that “they are not ordered temporally, 
that time does not change them in any way and that the idea of time cannot 
be applied to them.” Unconscious processes defy causality and chronology. 
Most of us have experienced some version of this when we dream: dreams 
rarely follow the linear narrative logic of real-life, real-time events. But is 
this really to say that unconscious processes are eternally stable and ever-
present, or does it rather mean that they do not fit neatly into the notion of 
time with which we are familiar? Does the unconscious truly lie outside of 
time, or is it rather structured by a different temporal order than the one we 
know? 
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Kristeva describes its timelessness as a “time outside time,” which 
would imply not a non-time but, precisely, a time outside of time, a time 
different from the time we know, a time, perhaps, that challenges our 
common notions of time. Following Freud, she stresses that the timeless 
breaks the linearity of time: it is “a rift” in “the linear time of 
consciousness.”15 And indeed, she notes, the timeless “has nothing to do 
with the belief in a life beyond, a time beyond, an eternity beyond.”16 In the 
current essay she underlines this distinction. Timelessness, she notes, 
“characterizes the unconscious and not the mystical nunc stans” – a term 
philosophers often use to refer to the “eternal now” at the heart of the 
metaphysics of presence.  
With Kristeva’s remarks in mind, I want to suggest that the term 
“timeless” is somewhat misleading, since it implies an exemption from any 
form of temporal movement. What Freud is trying to do, it seems to me, is to 
articulate a notion of time that has nothing in common with our current 
views of time as linear-progressive motion. He seeks to establish a temporal 
model that, precisely, would be impossible to label “temporal” from within 
our current temporal paradigm. The Freudian revolution, as Kristeva puts it, 
“has nothing else to seek or find but lost time.”17 In her analysis of the 
timeless in Intimate Revolt, she indeed suggests that we translate the term 
Zeitlos to “lost time” rather than to “timelessness.” Is Freud trying to retrieve 
a lost notion of time? A time different from the one that has come to 
dominate philosophical discourse? Jacques Derrida defends this view: “The 
timelessness of the unconscious is no doubt determined only in opposition 
to a common concept of time, a traditional concept, the metaphysical 
concept: the time of mechanics or the time of consciousness. We ought 
perhaps read Freud the way Heidegger reads Kant: like the cogito, the 
unconscious is no doubt timeless only from the standpoint of a certain 
vulgar concept of time.”18 But if the timeless in fact is temporal, albeit of a 
different temporal order than conscious time, then we must ask what kind of 
time it is. I will attempt to do so in what follows. 
*** 
A central feature of the Freudian Zeitlos is that it is non-linear in nature, 
and that it therefore puts into question basic notions such as causality and 
progress.19 This it has in common with a temporal model that I have 
discussed at length in my own work as revolutionary time. Revolutionary 
time is best described as a movement of perpetual return into the past and to 
a somatic realm of bodily experiences and drives, but it is a movement of 
return that makes possible change and new beginnings. As a temporal 
model, it offers an alternative to the two models traditionally available to us, 
namely repetitive-cyclical time on the one hand (typically associated with 
female subjectivity) and progressive-linear time on the other (associated 
instead with male subjectivity). If these temporal models have been built on 
a sexual division of temporal labor (female reproduction and male 
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production), revolutionary time returns us to the heterogeneity of the 
human body and to the idea that such sexual division of temporal labor 
generates a repetition of the same rather than offering new horizons of 
future possibilities. To explore the relationship between the timelessness of 
the unconscious and revolutionary time helps us better understand why 
Kristeva would tie the Freudian Zeitlos to her own analysis of revolt 
understood as a movement of perpetual return and renewal. 
In order to better elucidate the relationship between revolutionary time 
and the Freudian Zeitlos, we must look at the context in which Freud 
mentions this concept. His remarks on the topic in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle immediately follow his discussion of our tendency to compulsively 
repeat repressed memories of infantile sexual life. In remembering our past, 
we experience our memories precisely as belonging in the past (they have a 
place in linear time), but if the memory is repressed, we experience it time 
and again (we repeat it), and each time it is experienced as unfolding in the 
here and now of the present: the repressed memory affects our present life 
and is experienced as present rather than as the past event or wish that it in 
fact represents.20 Freud makes it very clear that this not only is a neurotic 
pattern: it is in fact common in most people, and we see examples of it in 
children’s play, or in our tendency to experience the same obstacles in one 
relationship after another.21  
It is his observation of this compulsion to repeat that leads Freud to 
suggest that there exists a death drive “beyond” the pleasure principle, 
already established in his earlier writings, and it is this death drive that 
Freud as well as Kristeva associate with timelessness. As Kristeva puts it in 
the present essay, “the analytical experience reconciles us with this 
timelessness, which is that of the drive, and more particularly the death 
drive.” The death drive paves the way for and is governed by a 
discontinuous temporality, a time incompatible with linear progress, a time 
of repetition or, as Freud himself puts it in implicit dialogue with Friedrich 
Nietzsche, a “perpetual recurrence of the same thing.”22 One way of 
understanding Freud’s claim that the unconscious is timeless is to link it to 
the idea that because some memories are repressed (because they are 
unconscious), the relationship between past and present is of an oscillating, 
non-linear kind. This in turn would mean not only that our past shapes our 
present, but also that the opposite is true, that our past is continuously 
shaped and reshaped by the present through which it can be accessed and 
retrieved. Or, as Johnston puts it: “the contextual parameters of the subject’s 
present retroactively alter the very past which supposedly influences this 
same present.”23 While repressed memories are not yet conscious, they need 
a catalyst in the present to appear even in their repressed form: “fresh 
mnemic traces behave like a Trojan horse for repressed childhood desires . . . 
the past overdetermines the present only insofar as the present inadvertently 
provides the past with certain opportune openings, namely, materials 
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possessing associational connections to repressed contents,” Johnston 
explains.24  
In Intimate Revolt, Kristeva presents a case study that serves to illustrate 
this temporal structure. Danièle has been in analysis for four years and 
speaks rarely of her mother: “She had always maintained outside of time the 
painful memory of this mother,” Kristeva notes.25 But when she finds out 
through friends that her analyst (Kristeva) is traveling to Jerusalem, Danièle 
has a dream about her mother, who had gone to Jerusalem as a little girl 
while her own parents (Danièle’s grandparents) were deported to the 
camps. The news about Kristeva’s present trip to Jerusalem is what triggers 
the repressed memories of an earlier trip to Jerusalem, and this present event 
marks the beginning of a possible working-through. Kristeva highlights the 
temporality at play for her patient: “Danièle had suffered, in the fullest sense 
of the term, an intersection between linear time, on the one hand, 
accentuated by my trip, which we were able to discuss, and, on the other 
hand, the timelessness of the mother-daughter symbiosis, in this case, 
opening onto a traumatic generational history.”26   
The term that Freud uses to describe this retroactive process is 
Nachträglichkeit.27 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis explain that the 
notion of Nachträglichkeit – rarely used explicitly by Freud, but developed at 
length by Jacques Lacan – was meant to convey “that the subject revises past 
events at a later date and that it is this revision which invests them with 
significance.”28 While Freud viewed Nachträglichkeit as a mark primarily of 
neurotic temporality, Lacan would highlight that it in fact is an integral 
aspect of the very process of psychoanalytic interpretation.29 What the 
analyst does is precisely to retroactively reconstruct and reinterpret past 
events in order to integrate them in the present.  
Luce Irigaray retrieves this notion of Nachträglichkeit from the Freudian 
corpus, viewing it precisely as a critical key through which Freud can be 
read against himself, and more specifically as a leverage point that would 
help us formulate a critique of the metaphysics of presence. In the opening 
essay of Speculum of the Other Woman, she notes that Freud “destroys a 
certain conception of the present, or of presence, when he stresses secondary 
revision [l’après-coup], over-determination, repetition compulsion, the death 
drive, etc.”30 What Irigaray seems to suggest is that the repetition that stands 
at the heart of both neurotic symptoms and the analytic cure as such 
represents an alternative temporal model, one that would challenge the 
privileging of presence and that would instigate a retrospective return to the 
past so as to make possible a different future.  
This all leads to the notion that the timelessness of the unconscious 
brings about a perpetual movement of retrospective return. Just as we might 
say that (female) cyclicality (so often described as monotonous repetition) 
has been made to be the non-time that (male) linearity needed in order to 
F a n n y  S ö d e r b ä c k  |  5 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXII, No 2 (2014)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2014.653 
appear as time (in the sense of progress), the timelessness of the unconscious 
could be understood as the determining ground that makes conscious time 
possible but that in itself would be, precisely, non-temporal. If we, instead, 
recognize that the Zeitlos is atemporal only if viewed from the standpoint of 
conscious-linear time (just like female cyclicality is “repetitive” only from the 
point of view of male “progress”), we should be able to characterize the 
repetition and retrospective return that governs the unconscious not as a 
dead repetition of the same but rather as the condition of possibility for 
renewal and change.  
Kristeva reminds us that we must “persevere, relentlessly recommence, 
the retrospective return so as to lead it to the limits of the representable/the 
thinkable/the bearable.” And to find oneself in this limit situation – to revolt 
– is to be able to forgive: “analytic interpretation emerges as a secular 
version of forgiveness, in which I see not just a suspension of judgment but a 
giving of meaning, beyond judgment, within transference-
countertransference.” We return in order to forgive – ourselves as well as 
others – and such forgiveness implies nothing less than a rebellious rebirth; 
a revolt in time and of time. 
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